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The basic question is do costs at the farm level really matter to our
basic production and export policy  for agricultural  commodities?
Over the decade of the 1970s there was a tremendous expansion  of
agricultural exports.  This has been viewed as a good thing - improv-
ing incomes  for farmers (and landlords)  and benefiting consumers  by
providing  foreign  exchange  for  the purchase  of more  foreign  goods
especially  oil. Farm groups  are pushing for programs to enhance ex-
ports. Both political parties view expanded  exports as essential to im-
prove farm incomes.
The assumption  has been that the U.S. is the low  cost producer  of
major  grains,  and that given  this basic  comparative  advantage  the
expansion  of a free  and open export market can only benefit the U.S.
One problem is that this basic assumption may not be true.
Many biological and physical scientists have expressed concern that
the expansion  of production  has come at high cost to resources. There
have  been  a number  of articles  about soil  erosion on marginal lands
and groundwater depletion that link these problems to the expansion
and intensification of agricultural  production for export.
These  resource based studies point to a declining  efficiency of agri-
cultural production  as agriculture expanded from its base in the early
1970s.  That  is,  increased  inputs  were  needed  for  a  given additional
level of output at the margin.  In most of these resource based studies
farmers  were viewed as  being forced  to expand  crop  production  into
less productive  and erosive  land  by  economic  circumstances  threat-
ening their survival.  The implication here is that farmers respond to
short run economic pressures that do not reflect the long run costs and
benefits  of resource use.
Economists  have  not responded  to the claims  of the physical  and
biological  scientists  and looked  at the expansion  of agricultural  pro-
duction  of the 1970s in economic terms that parallel the physical  and
biological  scientists'  concerns  about  declining  productivity.  In  addi-
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needs to be put  in a gains from trade framework to ensure  a compre-
hensive look at societal  costs and benefits from an agricultural export
promotion policy.
Our first step in bringing together those pieces necessary to analyze
the impact  of farm  costs  on production  and  export  policy  will be  to
look at the private  costs  the farmer pays  to produce  corn and wheat.
These private  costs will  be  compared  with farm  prices  received  and
will provide  one  perspective  for  viewing  decisions  made  at the farm
level.  This will  be  followed  by estimates  of some  of the agricultural
input subsidies,  long term resource depletion costs of agricultural pro-
duction,  potential  tax advantages  to  farmers,  and  government  farm
program  costs to get an estimate  of the non-private  or social  costs  of
production.  Finally,  we take  a look at export  policy to determine  the
net gains to U.S.  and foreign consumers.
Farm Level  Costs of Production
Most  of the information  gathered about  costs  of production  on the
farm  is expressed  in terms of average  costs for a group  of farms.  For
our purposes,  what would be most helpful would be information about
the marginal  cost of production.  The cost  of producing  one  more unit
beyond a given level of production.  Initially,  as a firm  gets into busi-
ness and starts production, the marginal cost of production is expected
to  decrease  as  the  firm  expands  beyond  its  first  unit  because  fixed
costs  can  be  spread  over  more  units.  Ultimately,  the  marginal  cost
begins to level  off and then increase  as diminishing returns  to one or
another limited resource sets in. Graphically  this is pictured as a "U"
shaped curve.
Some analyses of the current agricultural  situation  see inflation  or
disinflation (which causes the whole cost curve to move up and down)
as the determinants  of the state of the farm  economy.  The focus  here
is not on general  cost increases  or decreases, but  on changes in costs
as agricultural production  expands.  The determination  of where  dif-
ferent  levels  of agricultural  production  are  located  on the aggregate
marginal  cost curve for the U.S. is especially important to the analysis
of whether  we should expand our production to increase  exports. If we
are on the right hand side  of the  cost  of production curve,  increased
production  will  come  only at higher marginal  cost, which will  result
in  higher  average  cost.  Implicitly,  the  analyses  of the  physical  and
biological  scientists  are  assuming  we are facing  increasing marginal
costs  when  they  see  expanded  agricultural  production  bumping  up
against  resource constraints  causing diminishing returns.
There  is  some  cost  information  available  which we  can  use to  ap-
proximate our position on the cost curve. In 1974 the U.S. Department
of Agriculture  carried  out a nationwide  cost of production  survey on
major  agricultural  commodities.  Samples  were  taken  in  40  regions
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ity, farms  were  surveyed in those regions  accounting  for the bulk  of
the production  of that commodity.
The costs  reported on in the survey  included labor,  power and ma-
chinery, seed, fertilizer, chemicals, custom services, irrigation, interest
on operating capital, and other materials. Also included were overhead
costs, including taxes, electricity, insurance, farm auto - i.e., all costs
which were  not directly related to a specific crop. A management charge
was included and then six different alternative land charges were es-
timated. The land charge that we use here is the lowest one calculated.
Land  is  valued  when  the  farmer  actually  purchased  it  (acquisition
value).  The  charge for that land is then figured  so that it reflects the
actual  proportions  of cash  rent,  share  rent  and  owner-operator  ar-
rangements,  rather than just taking a straight percentage  charge.
There  is  much  discussion  among  economists  about  whether  land
should really be included  as a cost of production  for agriculture.  It is
the major capital cost in farming, but unlike a factory it does not wear
out if it is well treated - it remains as  a store  of value. However,  as
society  looks  at  farming and  makes judgment  about  whether  there
should  be public support  of the agricultural  sector  there  is a general
feeling  that farmers  should  be  able  to make  a  living while  meeting
land rent or land mortgage  costs over the bulk  of their lifetimes.
In this analysis we have included what we call a "direct" cost which
includes  direct,  overhead  and management  costs.  We  have  also  in-
cluded a "total" cost which is the sum of the direct costs and the lowest
available  land charge.
No comprehensive  cost  of production  survey has been made for  all
the major commodities  since  the original  1974  survey.  The national
and regional  average  cost figures  for major crops have  been updated
annually  by USDA using a computer  budget generator  and informa-
tion based upon limited spot surveys.
The  Food  and Agriculture  Act of 1977  required  the establishment
of national average  cost figures for all major commodities in succeed-
ing years, because  it linked changes in government price  supports to
changes  in  production  costs  (excluding  land).  However  the original
level of price support was such to include  land costs for many farmers.
These  annual average "cost of production" estimates are given for wheat
and corn on Table  1.
In addition to the average per unit cost figures provided in the 1974
survey,  the average  per unit costs  of the  sample producers  were  ar-
rayed from high cost to low cost for a specific commodity.  Cumulative
cost curves were then constructed to indicate which portion of the crop
was produced  below  a given  cost.  These cost curves were  constructed
for both the direct and total costs referred  to above.  Cumulative  cost
curves are not really marginal cost curves, but they are often the best
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USDA  Cost of Production  Estimates
Corn  Wheat
Year  Direct  Total  Direct  Total
(dollars per bushel)  (dollars per bushel)
1974  $1.62  $2.39  $2.04  $2.95
1975  $1.60  $2.23  $2.36  $3.15
1976  $1.62  $2.15  $2.55  $3.37
1977  $1.60  $2.12  $2.43  $3.10
1978  $1.49  $1.98  $2.48  $3.29
1979  $1.63  $2.12  $2.79  $3.72
1980  $2.36  $3.07  $3.62  $4.82
1981  $2.38  $3.11  $4.13  $5.32
approximation  that we have  to what an economist would call  a mar-
ginal cost  curve.  The cumulative  cost curves certainly  provide  some-
thing  better  than  national  or  regional  average  cost  figures  for  a
commodity.
These cost distributions were updated occasionally by USDA for in-
ternal use and analysis.  We followed  a similar procedure and updated
the  cumulative  cost  curves  for  corn  and  wheat  on  the  basis  of the
original  1974  distributions.  The  shape  of the  1974  distribution  was
thus maintained  for each  commodity  for succeeding  years as the dis-
tribution was shifted to match the change  in  value of the average per
unit cost of production  from one year to the next.
The scale of the distribution was proportionally adjusted to the changes
in  the  value  of the  average.  A  check  was  made  to  see whether  the
constructed  1980 curve  for wheat yielded  approximately the same re-
sults as the actual regional data for 1980 laid out on a cumulative cost
curve.  The results appeared  to be approximately  the same.
Having  constructed  a  set of cost  distributions  for wheat and  corn,
one can locate on each distribution the average price farmers  received
in  a  given year.  In  each  year  the seasonal  average  price  becomes  a
dividing  point  on  each  cost  distribution  of direct  and total  cost  and
allows the estimation of that proportion of the crop produced at a cost
greater than the average seasonal price. This information is presented
on Table 2.  It  shows that at various times large proportions of the corn
and wheat crops have been produced at costs that are higher than the
seasonal average  farm level  prices.
Costs Beyond  the Firm
The  costs that we  have looked  at so far that are analyzed  in  Table
2 are only the costs actually paid by a farmer to produce the commod-
ity.  A number of other "costs"  for producing corn or wheat are borne
by others not involved in  the actual production of these commodities.
These  social  costs  may  take  the  form  of transfer  payments  or  com-
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Proportion  of Wheat and Corn Produced At A Cost Greater
Than the Average Selling Price for That Season
Corn  Wheat
Seasonal  Proportional  Seasonal  Proportional
Average  Greater  Average  Greater
Year  Price  Than  Costs  Price  Than Costs
1974  $3.02  11%  $4.09  11%
1975  $2.54  23%  $3.55  24%
1976  $2.15  41%  $2.73  70%
1977  $2.02  48%  $2.33  77%
1978  $2.25  24%  $2.97  53%
1979  $2.52  18%  $3.78  35%
1980  $3.27  28%  $3.96  81%
modity programs for producers,  tax concessions  to producers,  costs  of
production that  are borne by future generations,  and input subsidies
that lower the cost of production  or increase the price received by the
farmer. The  social costs considered  here are prominent  ones and pro-
vide good examples.  There  are others that would have to be included
in a complete inventory of total social costs of production for corn and
wheat.
Input Subsidies
Over  the years,  public  and private  investment  in  agricultural  re-
search has yielded high rates of return through  increases  in produc-
tivity.  The  primary  beneficiaries  of such  research  investment  have
been consumers,  both domestic  and international,  and to a lesser ex-
tent early  adopters  of new  technology  who  benefit  from  a  period  of
reduced per unit production  costs relative to price.
Public research performed by the USDA and the state agricultural
experiment  stations  totaled  $1.2  billion in  1979  while  private agri-
cultural  research expenditures  exceeded  $2 billion.  Private research
costs are assumed to be recovered in the marketplace and are reflected
in farm input prices  or other costs to the farmer.  In contrast,  the ex-
penditure on publicly supported research does not get included in pri-
vate cost of production estimates.
There  is a delay between  research outlays  and the associated  pro-
ductivity impacts.  We  thus used a  seven year  lag in calculating  the
total  state  and  federal  research  outlays  for  corn  and  wheat.  These
estimates indicate that the annual expenditure  per bushel for 1974 to
1980 was $.002  per bushel for corn and $.006  per bushel for wheat.
A  more comprehensive  accounting  of research  which  included  ex-
tension and education expenditures  might show substantially  higher
costs.  However,  the base  figures presented  above  are  so low relative
to the subsidization of other aspects of production that questions should
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returns from such investments.
Transportation  is another  area where  there have been  public  sub-
sidies that have either reduced the cost of inputs or increased the price
of commodities  at the farm by reducing the price differential  to mar-
ket.  As an example:  transportation subsidies for  Canadian wheat  av-
eraged $0.27 per bushel for the period  1975 through 1979.  A conservative
estimate of U.S. transportation subsidies was arrived at by taking just
current and future estimated operating cost subsidies for water trans-
portation. This amounts to roughly $0.03 per bushel  for the transpor-
tation of corn  and wheat  by water.  Nothing  is  included here for  the
past or future capital  cost contributions made by the public.  The sub-
sidies for truck and rail are slightly  less than the subsidies for water
transportation.
Long Term  Societal Costs:
A national concern links increases in soil erosion to increases in the
volume of American  farm  exports.  The  impact of increasing  soil ero-
sion is  felt in terms of decreasing  soil productivity  and  declining  en-
vironmental quality  - especially  water quality.  The amount  of land
cropped in the U.S. has increased from under 300 million acres in 1970
to over 350 million  acres in 1980. Much of this increase was to satisfy
export demands, and much of the cropland expansion occurred on soils
more prone to erosion than those already  cropped.
USDA's 1977 National Resource Inventory gives some indication of
the seriousness  of soil erosion.  Considering five tons per acre  to be  a
tolerable long term level  of erosion  and looking at sheet and  rill ero-
sion,  16 percent of the cropland was suffering moderate threats to long
run productivity  (five to  14 tons per  acre per  year).  Seven percent  of
the cropland was suffering serious threats (greater than 14 tons). Sim-
ilar estimates  were  reported for  wind  erosion.  As these numbers  in-
dicate, a relatively small portion of the cropland, one which might not
be  needed  under  a  more  modest export  scenario,  suffers the  serious
erosion threat.
If we look just at the excess sheet  and rill erosion,  they account for
the annual  loss  of approximately  500  million  tons of topsoil  in corn
production  and 100  million  tons of topsoil  in wheat  production.  This
is  about  four  million  acre  inches  per  year.  The  value  of an  inch  of
topsoil  to productivity  has been  estimated  conservatively  at $60  per
acre inch  for Iowa.
Using this value for the nation, the annual soil productivity foregone
in corn  production  would be  about  $200  million  and  $44 million  for
wheat production. Taken against the whole crop this would amount to
$0.03 per bushel for corn and $0.02 per bushel for wheat. If this charge
is taken  against just those bushels  exported the costs  would be 0.10
per bushel  for corn and $0.14 per bushel  for wheat.
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may  overstate  the  productivity  value  of topsoil,  only  sheet  and rill
erosion  were included.  Wind erosion was not included,  and it tends to
be an important productivity factor for cropland for wheat. Second, the
damage  caused  by  the  eroded  soil  is  not  included.  The  costs  to  the
public  of reduced  water  and  air quality  is  not included  here,  and  it
would have  to be in any complete account  of total social costs.
The  downstream  social  costs  may  be  larger than the productivity
costs, and pertain to domestic production  as well as to that for export.
Finally, even though the productivity  costs of soil erosion are largely
incurred by a present or future generation of private landowners, con-
sumption of the soil capital stock is a long-term cost that will have to
be borne by consumers  as well.
Tax Advantages
Tax  advantages  to one  group are increased  tax liabilities to others
if a budget target is to be met. In this sense tax advantages to farmers
may result in increased tax costs  to non-farmers.  Farms are  allowed
to use  cash  accounting  where  most other businesses  are  required  to
use  accrual accounting.  Cash accounting gives the farmer more  flex-
ibility to choose when costs and profits will be accounted for, and thus
allows the balancing out of enterprize  costs and profits resulting in a
lower average  tax  obligation  over  the multi-year  period than  would
otherwise  be  possible.  Somewhat  the  same  advantage  is  granted  to
authors who may have  many years of work sold at one time.
Based upon a study of large Iowa cash grain farms (sales of $100,000
to $200,000  annually), the annual  after-tax income advantage  of cash
over accrual accounting  is  about $0.30 per bushel of corn that might
be raised on such a farm. There is also an increase in the value  of the
net worth of the farm allowed to practice cash accounting which amounts
to  $0.43  per bushel.  It is  crucial  to note that the magnitude  of the
advantage  is dependent  upon  the tax rate  which,  of course,  reflects
the level of income  of the farm. A smaller farm with sales of $20,000
to $30,000 annually has an income advantage  due to cash accounting
of only $0.14 per bushel annually and an increase in net worth of only
$0.13  annually.  About half of the grain  produced  in the U.S.  comes
from cash grain farms with sales over $100,000.  Thus we might expect
the tax benefit from cash accounting  to be just a bit less than for the
group  with  sales  from  $100,000  to $200,000.  We  estimated  the  per
bushel tax advantage  for wheat production to  be lower - about half
of that for corn.
At  times  when  there  was  little  or  no  profit  from farming  over  a
period of years, the provisions allowing farms to utilize cash account-
ing would be of substantially  less value because of the lower marginal
tax rates.
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what keeps farms  in farming, because private  costs  alone are higher
than farm  prices,  tax  policy  may  provide  a  partial  answer.  This  is
especially true in cases where producers or outside investors may have
income  from  other activities  which  can  be enhanced  on an after-tax
basis with cash accounting.  The tax advantage thus has the most im-
pact during  times of high commodity  prices,  which  imply strong de-
mand and little need for government intervention in the marketing of
commodities.
Costs  of Government  Commodity  Programs
Since  1933 a number of federal programs have been initiated aimed
at increasing  farm  incomes  through  influencing  the  supply and  de-
mand of wheat and corn in the U.S. An analysis of the costs of support
programs  for  wheat  and  corn  from  1965  through  1969  (a  period  of
chronic surpluses and heavy  government involvement)  indicates pro-
gram costs of $0.26 per bushel for corn and $0.65  per bushel for wheat
for all wheat and corn produced over that period.  Adjusting these pro-
gram costs by the price increase in the commodities from the late 1960s
to the late  1970s  gives  subsidy costs  of $0.52  per bushel  of corn  and
$1.35  per bushel of wheat. These might be considered  a high level  of
subsidy cost that would be required during  a period of surplus.
An analysis of the farmer-owned  reserve  program from 1978 through
1980 gives a per bushel program cost of $0.04 per bushel for corn and
$0.06  per bushel  for  wheat.  Over this period this  was a true storage
and release  program.  There  was  good  cyclical  demand  for  the  com-
modities and the government activity involved encouraging  storage in
years of surplus and allowing release  during periods of higher prices.
These may thus be considered lower bound government program costs
for corn and wheat.
Total Costs of Production
The total costs of production are given in Table 3. The starting point
is an  average  of the private  costs  for  1978 through  1980 taken from
Table  1. To  these are  added the non-private  or social costs  discussed
so far. However,  there is a problem here in just adding up these costs
because the dynamics of weather and changing demand result in changes
in some farm costs. Within the social costs there is a trade-off between
rather high levels of tax advantages (and relatively  low levels of gov-
ernment program costs) in years of strong demand for commodities as
compared  with the high costs  of government  programs  during  years
of continuing surplus production (when prices and tax advantages would
be lower).  These trade-offs  are reflected in the first two total cost es-
timates.
The third total cost estimate includes private costs from some of the
regions that  have higher  production  costs than the rest  of the  U.S..
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.60 - .90  .30  - .50
.15 - .25  .07  - .12
.26-  .52  .61  - 1.35
.04  .06
3.09 - 3.39  4.36 - 4.56
2.86 - 3.22 4.68 - 5.47
3.61 - 3.97  5.05 - 5.84
Farm Level Prices:  1978 - 1980  Average  2.68  3.57
(1) These are Total costs from Table 1
(2) Three  year  (1978 - 1980)  cost for  highest regions  producing 9 percent  of U.S.  corn
and  14 percent  of U.S. wheat.
These are  then added to a  set of social  costs under  conditions  of un-
profitable production  and surplus purchases  by government.  The re-
gions chosen here produced 9 percent of the corn and 14 percent of the
wheat. This is as close as  we can come conceptually  to what the mar-
ginal cost  of expanding production  for export  might be. It represents
the lower bound of that cost of expanding exports if we are on the right
side of the marginal  cost curve. It is much higher than average farm
price levels over this period.
Analysis
If we look at Table  2,  it seems as though we have devised  a system
that enables farmers  to continue to produce  at an apparent loss.  The
factors that allow farmers to do this relate to a general policy decision
taken  many years  ago  to provide  relatively  inexpensive  food  to the
American  public.  One of the first direct steps taken in this  direction
was the provision  of public research  support for agriculture.
This policy  has been  politically  supported  on  progressive  grounds
and has resulted in general tax revenues  being utilized to encourage
agricultural production at volumes above those that would be achieved
if private costs of agricultural production had to be completely covered
by the average  prices received.  That is, some of the difference between
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raise the total revenues  of producers.  One result has been a measure
of overproduction  and a reduction of commodity prices in the market-
place.
This  policy  has  made  political  sense  given  the  lower  prices  that
American  consumers  have  paid  for  these  agricultural  commodities.
Prior  to the early  1970s  there was  no  compelling  reason  to analyze
this public  spending  from tax revenues  to enhance  consumer welfare
because most of the  consumers  were  American and it was politically
acceptable  to  subsidize their basic  food consumption  on a progressive
basis. However,  the  issue changes when an increasingly  high propor-
tion  of the consumers  benefiting  from  commodities  being  marketed
below private and total costs are European, Japanese, Soviet,  or Chinese.
There  is  even  more  concern  if there  have  been resource  constraints
and a reduction in the development  of new technology  which result in
increasing marginal  costs  for agricultural production.
Exports and Marginal Analysis
The numbers  in Table  3  are important with  respect to the cost and
value  of U.S.  exports of corn  and wheat.  The numbers  show that the
price  per bushel  of the  good  sold  in the  export  market  is too  low  to
cover  the  full  production  costs.  For wheat,  the  price  received  from
exports covers only  65 percent of the high cost of production.
Looking just at the excess supply that farmers would have for export,
the provision of input subsidies to farmers would lower their effective
cost of production  and more could be sold at a lower  price. Add on the
notion  of domestic  price  supports,  and farmers  would  produce at  an
even  higher  level  with  the  expection  of the  higher price  while  the
actual  export price received would decline on the basis of the increased
quantity.  Input  subsidies  and/or  price  supports  create  a  divergence
between  the  cost of exports  and the average  price received  for  their
sale.  This  divergence  increases  as  costs  increase  and  quantities  pro-
duced increase.
Now it may well be that at times producers  receive prices which are
adequate to  cover their  private  costs  but  not total  costs.  In Table  3,
the three-year  average  price for  corn exceeds private  costs;  however,
it does not cover full costs.  Thus, importers in essence obtained  a sub-
sidy paid by the exporter  (the United States) of over $1  per bushel for
corn  and over $1.50  per bushel  for wheat  even though prices  received
may have  covered private production  costs.  These are implicit or hid-
den export  subsidies.
Explicit  subsidies  such  as  PL  480  sales  and  subsidized  credit  for
export sales are not included here. If the prices that producers received
had to cover both  private  and social  costs, output would  be less than
it  has  been  in  past  years,  exports  would  be  less,  and  the  marginal
acres in crop production  would be returned to  less intensive use. This
126is because the value of an additional unit of output sold on the export
market does not cover the cost of producing it.
Concluding  Observations
In looking at the distribution of costs for producing corn and wheat
in the U.S.  we see that in recent years a large proportion of these crops
is produced  at  private  costs  greater  than the  average  price received
by farmers.  Even if there are problems with the data so that the pro-
portion of farmers  producing at private  costs above  prices received  is
only half as many as indicated, this proportion would still be alarming.
In addition,  private  costs are not the  only ones that are important.
The  additional  costs in  the form  of input  subsidies,  social  costs, tax
advantages, and various government programs are borne by a broader
segment  of society. These  have been  borne willingly  in the past,  be-
cause  they resulted in lower  food  costs for domestic  consumers  when
most of the nation's corn and wheat was consumed at home. The recent
trend  has  been  to export  an  increasing  proportion  of our  corn  and
wheat. Under these circumstances  it appears  reasonable to view these
quantities exported as the marginal units produced after domestic de-
mand  is  satisfied.  On  this  basis  the  gains  from  trade  from  further
expansion of exports,  or even the maintenance  of the current level  of
exports at normal  crop prices  are marginal at best.
The  problems  outlined here  are  based primarily  on  average  costs
and average  revenue calculations.  The situation is even less favorable
to the expansion  or maintenance  of high production for exports if we
are  in a  situation  of increasing  marginal  costs  and  decreasing  mar-
ginal export revenues.
Our basic problem is distorted market signals caused by input sub-
sidies,  output  price  supports,  and environmental  factors  external  to
the private firm decisions. These distorted prices have caused the flow
of excess resources into agricultural production and export expansion.
Likewise,  the seeming permanence  of resources committed  to produc-
tion during periods of higher commodity prices further aggravates the
problem.
If improvements  in technology  do  not allow  us  to  get  out  of this
dilemma  by changing  the  shape  of the cost  curves  to put  us  in  the
declining  or stable cost  region,  we may  be forced  to  slide back down
the cost curve by withdrawing resources from agricultural production.
Our  other alternative  is  to increase  agricultural  prices  further to
address agriculture's financial problem or devise some combination of
the two. If we  actually are on the increasing portion of the  cost curve
for  agricultural  production,  the policy  alternatives  to deal with this
127are  very  different  from  those  being  suggested  which  center  around
increased  emphasis  on exports.
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